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Iran : The mullah’s road map

In his latest sentiments, Ahmadinejad stated again his intention to cooperate with the IAEA that described Geneva 2 as a “step forward” but it specified that this dialogue had no link with the nuclear crisis. Those sentiments contain the mullahs’ road map. | Decoding of the exciting things in store for Tehran |

On last July, in margin of G8 summit, the United States thumped the table and gave Tehran two months to stop its nuclear activities or at least accept to dialogue or else it threatened to adopt very heavy sanctions against it. Despite huge economic problems that are due to the sanctions that are already applied and that deprive Iran from foreign investment, Tehran then made light of this warning because it benefited from Russia’s unfailing support. On the beginning of September, Washington purchased Russia’s neutrality in return for the lightening of antimissile shield. Before the news was known, Moscow stopped to oppose openly with new sanctions which urged Tehran to reconsider its strategy : it didn’t accept the suspension of its activities but the dialogue in order to freeze sanction threats.

However by accepting to dialogue for fear of sanctions, Tehran has made a step backward faced with Americans. Thus it endangered its image of much serious adversary of the United States in the world, a pretention that brings it the Arab street’s support, a support that is essential to make it able to declare itself as the region’s arbiter. So to sit on the fence, the mullahs thus declared they were heading to dialogue not to negotiate about nuclear field but to represent the Arab street’s demands.

Americans didn’t impede such demand because they knew that despite this additional fine talk the Arab street provided, the step forward would cost a lot to the mullahs’ image. It hoped this trouble would make Tehran more swayed and it would then obtain the agreement it has expected since 30 years to control the Middle-East but also Central Asia.

This calculation appeared as erroneous. The mullahs’ regime sent representatives in Geneva to commit on the base of trifles : thus it obtained a calendar of minor cooperation which froze immediately the sanctions that were promised on last July. The Six that don’t wish to adopt any sanction accepted such basis. As soon as the Six confirmed the provisory freeze, Tehran claimed those commitments were made before Geneva 2 and its team mentioned solely there the Arab street’s demands.

Thus Tehran found the trick to offset the strategy that was implemented to discredit it toward the Arab street by respecting its commitments that were accepted as a minimum basis in Geneva 2 by the United States and its allies. This will permit it to boast that it cooperated with the IAEA to request in the meantime a longer sanction freeze. So this is not surprising to hear Ahmadinejad talking about the Islamic Republic’s will to cooperate with the IAEA by denying the existence of a link with Geneva 2 and the Iranian nuclear program. Tehran played the game as it is already played by Americans -by cheating with the rules- and has afforded to speak for a greater part of the IAEA in order to question the treatment itself of this issue by the Security Council.

This is absolutely dishonest but the mullahs have right in front of them Western States that are as dishonest as them by accepting the minimum basis solely to spare this regime sanctions, a regime they despite but they appreciate for commercial or strategic purpose.

The latest American sentiments mentioned some delay about the adoption of new sanctions and the uncertainty regarding their implementation by Obama appears obviously as some encouragement for Tehran’s cheating.

Paris also disposes of a negative role when it describes as “precisions” its undecided position and in order to delay sanctions, it mentions “divisions among its ministers” of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

France doesn’t find any advantage to imitate the mullahs who feign internal divisions with so-called moderates or conservatives. You can’t teach a dog new tomfoolery. Guéant’s sentiments simply convinced Tehran of the improbability of French sanctions. As usual, when we make a step backward in front of this regime, it hardens its position. After Guéant’s performance, the mullahs reduced again any opportunity of future minor cooperation with the IAEA : via its Minister of Foreign Affairs Mottaki, it announced it had no intention to join the additional protocol that allows unexpected inspections. If by chance the United States and its allies would pretend to adopt sanctions, Tehran will remind again its intention to cooperate with the IAEA.

This shady game will go on as long as the United States -and its allies- won’t apply by themselves the rules they decree for the rest of the world and as long as they will have the project of an agreement with the mullahs. Actually it’s necessary they reconsider their own road map if they hope for a different game.

The french version of this article :
- Iran : La feuille de route des mollahs
- (8 OCTOBRE 2009)

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| Mots Clefs | Institutions : Diplomatie (selon les mollahs) |
| Mots Clefs | Nucléaire : Politique Nucléaire des mollahs |
| Mots Clefs | Mollahs & co : Ahmadinejad |

| Mots Clefs | Décideurs : Sarkozy |
| Mots Clefs | Décideurs : OBAMA |
| Mots Clefs | Enjeux : Sanctions (du Conseil de Sécurité) |
| Mots Clefs | Enjeux : Sanctions Ciblées en cours d’application |