After 14 months of a rupture in the negotiations on the nuclear issue with the Six, Iran had accepted to come back to the round table two months ago. Contrary to the general idea, it was not a good will sign towards the appeasement prone by Obama, but a simple tactical retreat in order to avoid further sanctions. It wanted and obtained an adjournment of the sanctions promised by the U.S. during the G8 Summit.

Tehran found itself engaged against its will in an appeasement process that it does not want, for its power is based on its nuisance capacity in the Mid-East. With the support of the Arab opinion, that appreciates its slogans, the regime can destabilize the governments of the moderate Arab states in order to put pressure on their protector : the United States. In order to protect itself from a U.S. backing of its opponents, the Mullah state feels that its only protection is to remain the master of the anti-appeasement strategy. One of the conditions of such a policy is to dispose of armed militia like Hamas and Hezbollah and their African and South American ramifications.

Therefore, the Mullah regime and appeasement make two. Engaged against its will and incapable of avoiding the appeasement process in fear of sanctions, Tehran has been accumulating provocations in order to push the U.S. to threaten further unilateral sanctions to put an end to the multilateral discussions. These provocations having failed, Iran was in the obligation of coming to the round table and show appeasement to avoid sanctions. Iran was forced to accept the exchange offer made in the month of May by the U.S. Iran was to ship out 1200 kg of low enriched uranium and in return be delivered fuel rods for its medical research reactor, a vestige from the Shah epoch. The quantity of uranium targeted by the U.S. corresponds to what is an estimation of the quantity of enriched uranium needed to build a nuclear bomb. After having given in at Geneva summit, the regime is now questioning its engagement, for its hypothetical military nuclear capacity nuisance is a key element in its anti-appeasement policy.

Iran is now being pulled between the necessity of preserving this hypothetical military capacity nuisance and the momentary requirement of avoiding any further sanctions. The result is a blurred message in which Iran does not clearly state whether it will cooperate or not, nor will it say yes or no to the P5+1 offer. Iran remains ambiguous. One day its yes, the other no, or in the same day their Foreign Affairs Minister says yes despite “a profound mistrust for the West”, while the Parliament (that has no deciding power whatsoever) says no for the same reason. In the end it will be NO.

© WWW.IRAN-RESIST.ORG
The french version of this article (with more links) :
 Iran : Une profonde méfiance vis-à-vis des Occidentaux
 (2 NOVEMBRE 2009)