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Iran : An improbable revision of U.S. Intelligence Report of 2007

© IRAN-RESIST.ORG – October 17, 2009 | In November 2007, in view of facilitating a dialogue with Tehran to reach an entente, Washington had their Secret Services publish a report announcing that Tehran had ceased its nuclear research program in 2003 ! The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 had led to the freeze of newer sanctions on Tehran. Now that the Mullahs are refusing an appeasement with Washington, the Obama Administration has announced that it might consider reviewing this report.

The National Estimate Reports by American secret services are tools that determine America’s diplomacy with nations representing a threat to the United States. Officially these reports are the starting point for U.S. diplomacy. However, it is more appropriate to say that these reports are formulated in order to justify orientations already taken by the government on the basis of geopolitical factors or U.S. interests in certain natural resources. In order to coincide their interests with politically correct universal values, Washington uses the pretext of threats to world peace, and therefore gives an impersonal alibi to their diplomatic actions.

To justify the invasion of Iraq and the ousting of Saddam Hussein from power, the U.S. based their action on a 2002 report claiming that Iraq possessed important stocks of arms of massive destruction. Once Saddam replaced, and Iraq placed under their exclusive influence, Washington revised their conclusions on the existence of AMDs in Iraq.

A report prepares the terrain for certain policies and in case of a necessity of change in diplomacy a newer report can claim the contrary. We had in 2007 analysed the report for we had found it contrary to all the previous reports published from 2003 to 2007, claiming that Iran was immediate nuclear threat.

From 2003 to 2007, Washington relentlessly accused Iran of being an imminent nuclear threat and announced that it was prepared to retaliate by military strikes if necessary and demanding that the case be brought to the Security Council of the United Nations. The other super powers having greater economic interests in Iran, insisted that the case remain within the IAEA, for they feared that Washington was looking for a green light for military strikes through the Security Council. Tehran refusing all compromise, the other countries gave in by accepting that the Security Council be seized but with the pre-requisite that nothing more than economic sanctions would be imposed. Washington accepted the deal, and on December 23, 2006 a first resolution was adopted in that direction.

Washington had tricked the International community, for it never had any military ambitions in Iran, but was seeking an international legitimacy to their claim that Iran was a nuclear threat. With this legitimacy, Washington then imposed their own set sanctions on Tehran in order to force the Mullahs who controlled the Arab public opinion to become their regional allies through an entente and be able to agitate the Middle East hand in hand in accordance with their own interests. This would also give access to Central Asia and the Uyghurs and as far as Africa, all oil rich regions that also interest China.

The first major sanctions on Iran were implemented in October 2007. In order to combine them with incentives for dialogue, a pre-requisite condition for an entente, Washington published the 2007 report announcing major estimate errors in previous reports on the Iranian nuclear program. In view of justifying before the American public opinion direct discussions with Tehran, the report stated that the Mullahs had ceased their nuclear activities in 2003 and did not plan to resume them before 2010 or 2015. The report also intelligently gave a calendar for the dialogue combined with sanctions strategy by Washington.

Obama has continued Bush’s policy by bombarding the Mullahs with sanctions accompanied with secret, then open offers to dialogue leading to an entente. The two Administrations prevented harsh sanctions in order to spare the regime, for the strategy was based on an entente with the Mullahs, a key ally in their greater strategy of limiting China in its regional ambitions. An abrupt change of regime in Tehran would certainly put an end to the nuclear threat, especially if the nature of the regime would be democratic, but would not give Washington the guarantee of an entente in their regional agenda. It would thus shatter decades of efforts in their quest for the control of the Middle East. Despite American precautions, the Mullahs in their obstinate refusal have weakened their regime. The fear that if an entente was reached with Washington, they would lose the very favourable Arab public opinion they have, and thus lose their nuisance power in Israel and the other American allies of the region. This trump is definitely one that Tehran will hold onto in their dealings with Washington. It is therefore obvious that this dialogue is impossible.

It has been only two years since the U.S. produced the 2007 report as an accessory to their entente strategy with Tehran in the hope of forcing the Mullahs to the round table. The premature revision of this strategy of dialogue would be synonymous of Washington’s revision of its dialogue strategy with Tehran and the abandon of the objective that surpasses Iran and refocuses on American global interests. It seems unrealistic.

In order to eliminate a major obstacle in their entente with Tehran, Moscow the U.S. has revised their Eastern European anti-missile project stating that Iran is not an immediate ballistic threat to their Western allies. Therefore, if the conclusions of the 2007 report were to be modified, then Tehran would become once again a ballistic menace, and therefore the anti-missile project would then become once more an urgent affair. In exchange for the postponement of this project and a permanent military presence in Georgia, Washington has obtained Moscow’s support in their dealings with Tehran. Restarting the anti-missile program would therefore break the deal with Russia. The revision of the 2007 report is not only unrealistic but also impossible.

If Washington were to be pragmatic , and use the excuse of the newly discovered enrichment plant near Qom as a reason to revise the 2007 report it would still be improbable because of the small size of this plant. Furthermore, the plant is still under construction, empty and to be inspected by the IAEA shortly and surely to be declared without danger.

Then, why would Washington threaten to revise the report ? It is not the first time that Washington has mentioned a probable revision of this report. At each Iranian refusal of dialogue, Washington has made allusions to this probability. In the past it was an intimidation. However, now that Washington is incapable of going any further in their sanctions, the threat of a revision of the 2007 report is a mere cover-up of the American inaction.

Washington needs to occupy the media with their supposed obstinate effort to force Tehran to dialogue. The revision of the 2007 report is very much like the threat of an embargo on fuel exports to Tehran. First evoked in April 2008, then postponed to 2010. This threat was recently turned into a smaller sanction in the form of a bill adopted by the House of Representatives and the Senate this week, but suspended until 2010 by a presidential decision.

Taken by surprise, and with no concrete counter strategy Washington is making noise to cover the silence. It is so obvious that the Mullahs did not even bother react to this latest threat.

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The french version of this article :
- Iran : Une improbable révision du rapport de synthèse 2007
- (17 OCTOBRE 2009)

| Mots Clefs | Décideurs : OBAMA |
| Mots Clefs | Enjeux : Apaisement |

| Mots Clefs | Nucléaire : Politique Nucléaire des mollahs |