Western journalists often understand nothing to the mullahs’ decisions and they consider them as capricious people. However there’s nothing capricious in the mullahs’ reversals. The latter only behave depending on their adversary’s attitude, i.e. the United States.

The American State’s reactions are among the main preoccupations of the mullahs because it has sanctioned them for years and in the meantime it offered them to end sanctions if they would accept to make peace with it. Actually, it is seeking to normalize its relations in order to be able to come back to Iran and then weave the networks that would help its Islamist pawns to take the power inside this regime. Then it would have at its disposal the management of the State which inspires every Islamist movement worldwide. The mullahs would loose their power, their privileges and their misappropriate wealth. They would be forced to answer for 30 years of terrorist activities. De facto they have changed relentlessly their views in order to turn any dialogue demanded by Washington impossible. So to achieve this goal, in the past, the regime used to resort to multiple provocations that would lead to some warlike escalation. Then the Americans were expected to shrink back for fear of any conflict that would have harmed oil tanker traffic and made the mullahs get rid of sanctions. But the Americans have dodged such provocations and they have continued to apply their sanctions that have exhausted the regime. In order to neutralize such dodge, the mullahs accepted to meet them (on some conditions) in order to induce a clash and obtain then the escalation Washington has managed to avoid until then.

This time, Washington was constrained to dodge Tehran’s dialogue requests. Then it increased slightly its sanctions, especially by cutting carburant delivery to Iran in order to force the mullahs to cooperate (and then loose power and money without loosing necessarily their head) for fear of a penury that would lead to bloody riots.

This pressure increase required the mullahs to cause a clash. They tried everything and then they decided to offer again to organize a meeting. In reply to such offensive, Washington opposed discreetly to the supplying in Europe of Iranian planes. Tehran didn’t shrink back. The Americans who own 30% of the oil company Total asked it much discreetly to suspend its relations with the mullahs. Given that Total exploits Iranian oil deposits and remunerates the mullahs with 1/3 of its production, the step consisted of depriving Iran from the barrels it needs to produce minimum quantity of carburant and fulfil the needs of its diverse militias. Thus Washington made with great discretion the mullahs face with a penury that could lead to their collapse. This was meant for inciting them to accept its offer. But Tehran refused (there were few proposals after Total announcements).

Exactly one week after Total announcement, on the Friday 22 and on the Saturday 23 October, American media published some compromising documents about the mullahs’ interference in Iraq and in Afghanistan. This gave the illusion that Washington changed its global policy towards the mullahs. The latter panicked : on the 24 October, they told about the efforts they have carried out to start a dialogue. At the same time, in order to make its bluff successful, Washington remained silent.

But afterwards, Washington didn’t disclose further revelations and above all it didn’t take an official position about revelations of interference. At that time, Tehran understood that it was question of some bluff and on the 26 October, it called into question its disposition to dialogue.

Two days later, Tehran went further in its refusal of appeasement and it imposed impossible conditions to its project of dialogue. Such stand was justified by three hazardous decisions that Washington took.

1 | The first decision was the announcement that the Department of American Treasure put on its black list 37 companies of maritime freight based in Germany, Malta or Cyprus because they collaborated with the mullahs in order to freight dangerous goods. Such announcement is pure heresy because companies of maritime freight dispose of offices or screen-companies everywhere in the world (in every big port). The closure of a single office will change nothing to the situation.

The mullahs had then to face some announcement with great media coverage for a phoney sanction while for months they have been hit with heavy energy sanctions that were applied in discretion. It appeared that such announcement was aimed at the American opinion. The regime linked it with the upcoming American elections : it understood that Obama was trying to convince his electors that he was much active towards Iran. The regime perceived it as a weak point of the Obama administration. It understood there was something to squeeze out of it.

2 | The day after the announcement of the 37 blacklisted companies, Washington criticised officially via Susan Rice, its UNO ambassador, the mullahs’ interference in Lebanon. However Mrs Rice refrained from making some compromising statement. Washington was surfing on a wave of media stand. Tehran felt that Obama was looking for improving his media image. This confirmed his vulnerability during the election ; he was then convinced it was the right time to take action.

3 | The same day, Hillary Clinton wished happy birthday to Ahmadinejad. Tehran was convinced that the Obama administration was trying to get some immediate diplomatic victory. Whenever it noticed such flaw, the regime took action and offered a dialogue under its own conditions. Washington didn’t sketch because it can’t criticize Tehran : this would call into question any new opportunity of dialogue. Tehran then appeared in a situation in which it could cause a scandal at any meeting.

In our analysis dated of the 27 October, we stated that Washington would feel trapped and that it would have consequently to find a mean that would intimidate the mullahs. Or else, it would have to take action in order to sabotage such meeting and thus avoid to going on a slippery ground. Its first gesture was to invite Tehran to accept a constructive dialogue.

In reply, the regime reassessed its conditions thought the intermediary of an adviser of Ahmadinejad in order to obtain some answer about the matter : preferably a negative answer that would lead to a clash.

Washington mentioned a case of Human Rights violation (in order to sabotage appeasement) but it didn’t tell anything about the mullahs’ required conditions. The latter interpreted it as a sign of (electoral) unrest. They hurried to accept a resumption of negotiations before the date they initially proposed, i.e. before the upcoming election in order to take advantage from this ideal unrest and induce the big crisis they need to make Washington shrink back.

© WWW.IRAN-RESIST.ORG
The french version of this article :
 Iran : Pourquoi le régime vient-il d’accepter le dialogue sur le nucléaire ?
 (1ER NOVEMBRE 2010)